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The Fate of Future Personalized Medicine Treatment Patents 
Gyuhyun Bae* 
I. Introduction  
Since the founding of this country, patents have been at the heart of U.S. policy to incen-
tivize and further innovation.1  The great importance of patents in American society is evident 
through the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution, which recognizes the various rights 
of patent holders.2  Under the Constitution, the main purpose of the patent system is “to promote 
the progress of science and useful arts” by rewarding innovation with a temporary monopoly.3  
Further, after the adoption of the Constitution, Congress passed the first patent statute the follow-
ing year in 1790.4  By granting an inventor a limited right of exclusion, patent law provides incen-
tives for inventors to promote the improvement of new technologies, which in turn has a positive 
impact on our society by providing improved goods, services, and processes, which ultimately 
drives economic growth.5   
Today, patents remain objects of prestige within our society and are regarded with es-
teemed status for the continuous growth in the field of technology and life sciences.  In 2018, the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) received almost 650,000 patent applications 
and issued over 300,000 patents, which puts the U.S tied for second place as the strongest intel-
lectual property regime in the world.6  However, although the U.S remains a top contributor in the 
 
*J.D. Candidate, 2021, Seton Hall University School of Law; Pharm.D., 2018, Rutgers University.  
1 Maureen K. Ohlhausen, The Case for a Strong Patent System, Federal Trade Commission (2016). 
2 U.S. CONST. art. 1. §8, cl.8.  
3 Id.  
4 Ohlhausen, supra note 1.  
5 Rebecca Lindhorst, Note, Two-Stepping Through Alice’s Wasteland of Patent-Eligible Subject Matter: Why The 
Supreme Court Should Replace The Mayo/Alice Test, 69 CASE W. RES. 731, 732 (2019).  
6 Eileen McDermott, IBM Tops Patent Charts (Again) with 9,100 U.S. Patents in 2018, IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 19, 
2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/01/09/ibm-tops-patent-charts-9100-us-patents-2018/id=104889/.  
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patent world, there is a slowing trend in patent applications in recent years as these numbers rep-
resent a 3.5% decline from 2017.7  Part of the reason may have to do with the patent applicant’s 
struggle to balance the unpredictability of the patent grant with the enormous cost risks involved 
in developing these new technologies.8  Thus, a predictable patent system is crucial in allowing 
inventors to protect their rewards for successful inventions and to make educated decisions on 
where to allocate resources when developing such new technologies.9   
The patent applicant’s confusion lies in the application of the current subject matter eligi-
bility requirements under Section 101 of the Patent Act, which includes a judicially created excep-
tion for laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.10  These exceptions are ineligible 
for patent rights, and the courts have unsurprisingly struggled to define what exactly fits within 
the definition of “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.”  The Supreme Court’s 
current patent-eligibility test, the Mayo/Alice Two-Step, has been criticized for rejecting and in-
validating many patents since its adoption.11  Recently, however, the Federal Circuit held that pa-
tent claims featuring a novel diagnostic discovery were not directed to a natural law “even though 
the natural law at issue was plainly the only inventive aspect of the claims.”12  In Vanda Pharms. 
Inc. v. West-Ward Pharms. Int’l Ltd., part of the dispute was over a claim on methods of treating 
schizophrenic patients with a medication called iloperidone.13  The Court held that the patent 
claims were not directed to a law of nature, even where claims relied on a natural law for their 
 
7 Id. 
8 Lindhorst, supra note 5. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id.  The Mayo/Alice test involves a two-step analysis for patent eligible subject matter. Step one inquires whether 
the claims are directed to laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.  If so, step two determines whether 
the claim contains an “inventive concept” sufficient to transform the claimed idea into a patent-eligible application.  
Vanda Pharms. Inc. v. West-Ward Pharms. Int’l Ltd., 887 F.3d 1117, 1133 (2018). 
12 Peter A. Hecker, How To Claim Something When the Inventive Aspect Is A Natural Law, 19 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. 
& INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 1 (2018). 
13 Vanda Pharms. Inc. v. West-Ward Pharms. Int’l Ltd., 887 F.3d 1117, 1133 (2018). 
 
   4
inventive concept.14  Thus, such claims are still patent-eligible subject matter if detailed with spec-
ificity.  In particular, if claims are “directed to a specific method of treatment for specific patients 
using a specific compound at specific doses to achieve a specific outcome.”15  But just how much 
specificity is required to meet this threshold?  The Vanda outcome has inevitably added to the 
confusion in the debate of subject matter eligibility for patent rights and further highlights the need 
for clarification on this issue.  
This Comment will examine the difficulties courts deal with regarding patent eligibility 
challenges, especially in method of treatment claims, and the need for reform of Section 101 of 
the Patent Act in determining what exactly constitutes patent eligible subject matter.  Part II will 
analyze cases dealing with matters of subject matter eligibility and the difficulties in applying the 
current legal framework, the Mayo/Alice Two-Step.  Part III will discuss the recent Vanda decision 
and compare it with Mayo Collaborative Services v. Promethus Laboratories, Inc.  Part IV will 
examine the implications of the Vanda decision on future method of treatment claims.  Part V will 
review the need for clarification of Section 101 of the Patent Act.  Part VI will discuss the current 
draft reform bill and detail the shortfalls of the proposed solutions.  Part Vll will conclude.  To 
successfully achieve the purpose of the patent system, this Comment recommends adopting parts 
of the draft reform bill as its current form does not adequately address the current issues on subject 
matter eligibility of patents.  
II. Development and Application of the Patent Act of 1952 
A. Section 101 of the Patent Act 
 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 1134. 
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To obtain a patent, an inventor must file an application with the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) that meets several requirements.16  One of the requirements that needs 
to be met is Section 101, which states, “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may 
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”17  Since the 1800s, 
however, courts have narrowed the types of subject matter that are considered patent eligible.18  
Notably, laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are ineligible for protection within 
the patent system.19  This stems from the belief that these areas are inappropriate for patenting and 
granting a monopoly on the “basic tools of scientific and technological work” would essentially 
impede innovation by preventing others from using these basic building blocks of human creativ-
ity.20  Without an objective standard set forth by these exceptions, however, courts have struggled 
to determine whether an invention is patent eligible or patent ineligible.  This has, in turn, led to 
varying judicial applications of the subject matter eligibility requirement and confusion for both 
patent applicants and patent examiners.21  
B. Supreme Court Cases Establishing Standards of Subject Matter Eligibility  
In 2012, the Court in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Promethus Laboratories, Inc., inval-
idated the claim as patent ineligible.22  This case involved a claim to a method for determining the 
optimal dose range of an immunosuppressive drug, called thiopurine, by measuring the blood level 
 
16 35 U.S.C. §101 (2012). 
17 Id. 
18 Lindhorst, supra note 5, at 738. 
19 Id. 
20 Interval Licensing, LLC v. AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d 1335, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
21 Lindhorst, supra note 5, at 738. 
22 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012). 
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of its metabolite, which then informs the physician whether or not to adjust the dosage.23  Rela-
tionships between concentrations of metabolites in the blood and the likelihood that a thiopurine 
drug dosage would prove ineffective or cause harm were determined to be known laws of nature.24  
The Court reasoned that there was a lack of a sufficiently inventive step.25  Steps of administering 
drugs by physicians who already used the drugs, advising the physicians to apply the natural laws 
in making treatment decisions, and directing the measurement of metabolite levels “simply told 
physicians to engage in well-understood, routine, conventional activity previously engaged in by 
scientists in the field.”26  Further, the Court was concerned about preemption where “the grant of 
patents that tie up their use will inhibit future innovation premised upon them.”27  Thus, in order 
to overcome the hurdle of “laws of nature,” a claim had to contain a sufficiently inventive step.28  
However, once again, the ambiguity of the term “inventive step” remains unsolved by this Court’s 
decision.  
The following year in 2013, the Court held that breast and ovarian cancer susceptibility 
genes were patent ineligible as well.29  In Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 
Myriad Genetics monopolized tests on the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, which can be used to test 
a person’s predisposition to the development of breast or ovarian cancer.30  The challenged patents 
covered sequences of parts of the genes’ isolated DNA and “cDNA” (a synthetic type of DNA that 





26 Id. at 72. 
27 Id. 
28 Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72. 
29 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 579 (2013). 
30 Id.  Breast Cancer Genes (BRCA) are different genes that have been found to impact a person’s chance of devel-
oping breast cancer. BRCA: The Breast Cancer Gene, National Breast Cancer Foundation, Inc. (Nov. 3, 2019). 
31 Id. 
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genes from the rest of the human genome, the genes contained a sufficiently inventive step that 
warranted a patent.32  Here, the Court’s analysis focused on whether the patent claims fell under 
the patent ineligible category of "natural phenomena.”33  The Court held that the company "did not 
create anything new” and that DNA is a product of nature that “is not patent eligible merely be-
cause it has been isolated.”34  Once again, there was a lack of inventive step required to survive 
the patent ineligible criteria of “natural phenomena.” 
Subsequently in 2014, the Court once again held claims on formulation and trading of risk 
management contracts patent ineligible for falling within the judicial exception of “abstract 
ideas.”35  In Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, the claims were: (1) method for exchanging finan-
cial obligations, (2) computer system configured to carry out the method for exchanging obliga-
tions, and (3) computer-readable medium containing program code for performing the method of 
exchanging obligations.36  The Court held that the claims were directed to the patent ineligible 
concept of the abstract idea of intermediated settlement.37  Petitioners failed to transform this ab-
stract idea into a patent eligible invention, and thus, the claims did not warrant a patent.38   
C. Mayo/Alice Two-Step Test 
Through the cases mentioned above, the Court established the legal framework, called the 
Mayo/Alice Two-Step Test, for distinguishing a patent that claims laws of nature, natural phenom-
ena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent eligible applications of those concepts.39  The 
 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 58.  
34 Id. at 582.  




39 Jack S. Barufka, Ngai Zhang, Matthew W. Hindman, & Tiffany C. Kuo, Evaluating the Evaluation: Breaking 
Down New USPTO Guidance for Patent-Eligible Subject Matter, PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP (Jan. 
1, 2019), https://www.pillsburylaw.com/en/news-and-insights/uspto-guidance-patent.html. 
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Mayo/Alice Two-Step Test consists of Step 2A and Step 2B. First, under Step 2A, the court deter-
mines whether a patent claim is “directed to a law of nature, a natural phenomenon or an abstract 
idea.”40  If not, then the invention is determined to be patent eligible and there is no need to proceed 
to step 2B.41  Second, if the claim is directed to a law of nature, natural phenomenon or abstract 
idea, then under Step 2B, the court determines whether “the claim recites additional elements that 
amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.”42  In other words, this inquiry asks 
whether there is an inventive application of the judicial exception, otherwise known as an “in-
ventive concept,” to render the claim patent eligible. 43   
D. Difficulties of Mayo/Alice Two-Step Test 
One of the main criticisms of this test was the difficulty for examiners to apply this in a 
predictable manner—particularly in the context of abstract ideas. This has, in turn, raised concerns 
that the patent office is reaching inconsistent results.44  Under Step 2A, for example, the determi-
nation of what an abstract idea constitutes relied heavily on prior judicial examples.45  Specifically, 
under Step 2A, examiners were required to compare a concept in a patent claim to concepts in 
prior court decisions to determine if the claimed concept was similar to a court-identified abstract 
concept.46  Because the Federal Circuit has issued a large number of decisions identifying subject 
matter as abstract or not, it has become increasingly difficult for examiners to apply the Al-
ice/Mayo Two-Step in a predictable manner.  Additionally, due to the sheer volume of post-Al-
ice case law that exists and the inconsistent application of the Alice/Mayo Two-Step framework 
 
40 Alice, 573 U.S. at 214. 
41 Barufka, Zhang, Hindman, & Kuo, supra note 39. 
42 Alice, 573 U.S. at 208. 
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by the courts, an examiner could now just easily pick and choose case examples to support a re-
jection under Section 101.47  This raises the concern that different examiners within and between 
technology centers may ultimately reach inconsistent results.48  Thus, even with the Alice/Mayo 
Two-Step legal framework for determining patent eligible subject matter, changes are necessary 
to increase clarity and consistency in this area of patent law. 
In January of 2019, the USPTO revised its guideline to provide clarifications on this legal 
framework.49  The guideline states that only when a claim recites a judicial exception and fails to 
integrate the exception into a practical application is the claim considered “directed to” a judicial 
exception under Step 2A, thereby triggering further analysis under Step 2B.50 The revised guide-
line further provides specific groupings of subject matter that is considered to be an abstract idea.51  
In particular, examiners are directed to determine whether concepts recited in the patent claim fall 
within the following enumerated groupings of abstract ideas.52  Except in rare cases, patent claims 
not falling within any of these categories do not recite an abstract idea and are thus patent eligible.53  
The specific groupings of abstract ideas are: 
a)  Mathematical concepts (mathematical relationships, mathematical formulas or 
equations, mathematical calculations); 
b)  Certain methods of organizing human activity (fundamental economic princi-
ples or practices, including hedging, insurance, mitigating risk); commercial or le-
gal interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts; legal obligations; 
advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business relations); manag-
ing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people (including 
social activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions); and 
c)  Mental processes (concepts performed in the human mind, including an obser-





49 Barufka, Zhang, Hindman, & Kuo, supra note 39. 
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Overall, the revised guideline’s list of what constitutes an abstract idea is likely to remedy 
examiners’ picking and choosing case law to support their rejections.55  The incorporation of Step 
2A Prong 2’s practical application requirement allows for more efficient resolution at an earlier 
stage.56  Patentees should ensure that potentially abstract ideas are integrated into a practical ap-
plication, whether through an improvement to computer technology or applying them to specific 
processes, machines or manufactures, etc.57  The ability for Section 101 eligibility to be resolved 
through evaluation of all additional elements regardless of their conventionality in Step 2A Prong 
2 should be favorable to patentees.58  Therefore, the revised guideline is likely to diminish the 
number of patent applications that are rejected on eligibility grounds by reducing the number of 
things the USPTO can consider patent ineligible abstract ideas under Prong 1 of Step 2A and 
incorporating the practical application requirement under Prong 2 of Step 2A.59 
E. Post Mayo and Alice  
After the Mayo/Alice decision, the Federal Circuit upheld a patent claiming a method of 
producing liver cells that remain viable following multiple cryopreservation.60  In Rapid Litig. 
Mgmt. Ltd. v. CellzDirect, the Court’s decision was based on finding that the claim was directed 
not at the natural law defining liver cells’ ability to survive multiple freeze-thaw cycles, but rather 
at a “new and useful laboratory technique for preserving” liver cells.61  The Court reasoned that 
“the natural ability of the subject matter to undergo the process does not make the claim directed 
 





60 Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042, 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2016).  Cryopreservation is the use of 
very low temperatures to preserve structurally intact living cells and tissues.  Pegg, Principles of Cryopreservation, 
NCBI (Nov. 3, 2019), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18080461. 
61 Id. at 1047. 
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to that natural ability.”62   Although the “individual steps of freezing and thawing were well 
known,” the process of repeating those steps to preserve liver cells for multiple cycles was, as a 
whole, “far from routine and conventional.”63  Thus, this survived under Step 2B of the Mayo/Al-
ice Two-Step and was patent eligible.   
III. Vanda Pharmaceuticals v. West-Ward Pharmaceuticals (2018) 
A. Overview 
A split Federal Circuit held that method of treatment claims are not directed to laws of 
nature and are therefore patentable subject matter.64  In Vanda, the petitioner claimed a method for 
treating schizophrenic patients with a medication called iloperidone.65  This method required ob-
taining a biological sample from the patient and performing a genotype assay to determine if the 
patient was a CYP2D6 poor metabolizer.66  The rationale behind this method claim was the ability 
to control the patient’s risk of adverse effects from the medication.67  Iloperidone is metabolized 
by CYP2D6 and thus, poor metabolizers have a higher chance of experiencing adverse effects, 
such as QT prolongation, which can lead to serious cardiac complications.68   Following this 




64 Vanda Pharms. Inc. v. West-Ward Pharms. Int’l Ltd., 887 F.3d 1117, 1132 (2018). 
65 Id.. 
66 Id. at 1133.  Cytochrome P2D6 (CYP2D6) is an enzyme involved in the metabolism of various drugs. CYP2D6 
poor metabolizers are unable to break down drugs, which then accumulates within the body and increases the person’s 
chances of experiencing adverse effects from the medication.  John R. Horn & Philip D. Hansten, Get to Know an 
Enzyme: CYP2D6, PHARMACY TIMES (Nov. 3, 2019), https://www.pharmacytimes.com/publications/is-
sue/2008/2008-07/2008-07-8624. 
67 Id. 
68 Id.  The QT interval is the length of time required for the heart to repolarize following the onset of depolarization. 
Drugs that induce QT interval prolongation can lead to fatal ventricular arrhythmias and sudden cardiac death.  Ja-
mie L. Thompson, Drug-Induced QT Prolongation, U.S. PHARMACIST (Nov. 3, 2019), https://www.uspharma-
cist.com/article/drug-induced-qt-prolongation. 
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to administer 12mg/day or less.69  However, if the patient was not a CYP2D6 poor metabolizer, 
then physicians were to administer 12–24mg/day.70   
1. Main Dispute Regarding Subject Matter Eligibility 
West-Ward’s argument asserted that the claim was ineligible subject matter under Section 
101 because the claim is directed to a natural relationship between iloperidone, CYP2D6 metabo-
lism, and QT prolongation.71  Thus, the asserted claim added nothing inventive to those natural 
laws and phenomena, as required under Step 2B of the Mayo/Alice Two-Step Test.72  
On the contrary, Vanda’s argument focused on Step 2A of the Mayo/Alice Two-Step Test.  
Here, the relevant inquiry was whether the claims at issue were “directed to” one of those patent-
ineligible exceptions.73  The opinion notes that the Supreme Court has cautioned against an overly 
broad interpretation of ineligible subject matter as it could “eviscerate patent law” since “all in-
ventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, 
or abstract ideas.”74  Following this guidance, Vanda’s asserted claim of “a method for treating a 
patient with iloperidone, wherein the patient is suffering from schizophrenia” can be understood 
as requiring specific steps.75  The claim requires a physician to administer specific doses: either 12 
mg/day or less or between 12–24 mg/day depending on the result of the genotype assay.76  It is a 
new way of using an existing drug, iloperidone, to reduce the adverse risk of QT prolongation that 
is associated with its use.77  In other words, West-Ward’s argument for a Step 2B analysis was 
 
69 Id. 






76 Vanda, 887 F.3d at 1136. 
77 Id. at 1137. 
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unnecessary because Step 2A was already satisfied.  Ultimately, the Court upheld this claim as 
valid under subject matter eligibility.78  
2. Chief Judge Prost’s Dissent 
Naturally, this decision invokes the continuing debate regarding the exact scope of patent 
eligible subject matter and the perplexity of classifying “laws of nature, natural phenomena, or 
abstract idea.”  This ongoing struggle is illustrated by Chief Judge Prost’s dissent, which states 
that Vanda “claims no more than instructions directing an audience to apply the natural law in a 
routine and conventional manner.”79  Physicians have used iloperidone to treat schizophrenia long 
before the patent claim at issue in this case.80  Chief Judge Prost contends that this claim simply 
discloses a natural law: that a known side effect of an existing medication could be reduced by 
administering a lower dose to patients who are CYP2D6 poor metabolizers.81  Because the claim 
relies on a natural law, a Step 2B analysis of the Alice/Mayo Two-Step governs. Simply adminis-
tering a medication is routine and conventional for physicians, without the addition of an inventive 
concept.  Therefore, the claim should fail because it is not patent eligible subject matter under Step 
2B.82   
B. Differentiating Vanda and Mayo 
In Mayo, the claims were directed to a diagnostic method based on the “relationships be-
tween concentrations of certain metabolites in the blood and likelihood that a dosage of a thiopu-
rine drug will prove ineffective or cause harm.”83  This relationship is a consequence of the ways 





81 Id.at 1138. 
82 Vanda, 887 F.3d at 1138. 
83 Mayo, 566 U.S. at 66. 
84 Id. at 71. 
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On the contrary, in Vanda, the claims were directed to a specific method of treatment for specific 
patients using a specific compound at specific doses to achieve a specific outcome.85  The asserted 
claims encompass more than the natural relationship between compounds.86  Instead, they recite a 
method of treating patients based on this relationship.87 
Also in Mayo, the claims “tie up [a] doctor’s subsequent treatment decision whether that 
treatment does, or does not, change in light of the inference the doctor has drawn using the corre-
lations.”88  This threatens to inhibit the development of more refined treatment recommenda-
tions.89  Thus, it could be infringed by treatment with thiopurine “whether that treatment does, or 
does not, change in light of the inference” indicated by the natural law.90 
Finally, in Vanda, the claims require physicians to “internally administer iloperidone to 
patient an amount” such as 12 mg/day whereas in Mayo, the claim stated that the metabolite level 
in blood simply suggests “a need to increase or decrease dosage, without prescribing a specific 
dose regimen or other gadded steps to take as a result of that indication.”91  This highlights the 
specific dosage indicated by the method claim in Vanda and offers the possibility to reconcile the 
different outcomes held by the courts.  
IV. The Implications of Vanda 
A. Impact On Method of Treatment Patents in the Pharmaceutical And Biologics Industry 
Vanda sets a precedent that diagnostics may be patent eligible if they include a method of 
treatment step.92  This is well illustrated by Peter Hecker’s hypothetical example: “Suppose you 
 
85 Vanda, 887 F.3d.at 1135. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71.  
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id.; Vanda, 887 F.3d at 1135. 
92 Hecker, supra note 12, at 6. 
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discovered Vandase, an enzyme encoded by a well-known gene, enhances patent bar passage rates 
when expressed at high levels.”93  Here, patent applicants will likely get a 101 subject matter re-
jection if the claim is “a method for predicting whether a subject will pass a patent bar, comprising: 
obtaining an expression level of a nucleic acid encoding Vandase; and prognosing whether the 
subject will pass the patent bar based on said expression.”94  Thus, a better claim would be a 
method for treating a subject suffering from the patent bar, comprising of:  
Obtaining an expression level of a nucleic acid encoding Vandase; Prognosis 
whether the subject will have difficulty passing the patent bar based on said expres-
sion; and administering a patent bar preparation course comprising videos of John 
White or Gene Quinn for 8–12 hours per day for 4–8 weeks if the subject is prog-
noses as having difficulty passing the patent bar based on said expression, and ad-
ministering a patent bar preparation course comprising 1–2 hours per day of past 
patent bar questions for 1–2 weeks if the subject is prognoses as not having diffi-
culty passing the patent bar based on said expression.95   
 
Utilizing Vanda, one can claim that this only touches upon a law of nature and is directed 
to a method of treatment because it “recites a specific treatment for specific patients using a spe-
cific study strategy at specific doses.”96  In essence, the claim recites significantly more to fall 
under the “inventive aspect” determination of Step 2B of Alice/Mayo Two-Step.97  Because Vanda 
did not consider whether the treatment steps were routine or conventional, one could also argue 








98 Hecker, supra note 12, at 7. 
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Overall, incorporating what is considered “natural law” does not necessarily destroy an 
applicant’s claim.99  Rather, the applicant simply needs to define an application of law that is spe-
cific enough.100  However, this problem continues to be an issue because of the difficulty of diag-
nostic claims being in fact redrafted as method-of-treatment claims.101 
V. The Need for Clarification of Section 101 of the Patent Act 
A. Potential Problems Arising From Vanda  
The uncertainty and confusion resulting from the Court’s recent decisions create significant 
problems for many companies and investors as well.  These problems arise when contemplating 
research and development projects, as well as for patent prosecutors, patent examiners, and patent 
jurists.102  As mentioned previously, a test requiring a search for an “inventive” application of a 
natural law or physical phenomenon does not provide adequate objective guidance.103  If the Fed-
eral Circuit decision stands, Vanda sets a precedent that diagnostics may be patent eligible if they 
include a method of treatment step.104  Following the Vanda decision, the Federal Circuit issued 
two more decisions concerning the patent eligibility of method of treatment claims by reversing 
the District Court decisions.  In Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 
methods of using oxymorphone to treat pain in patients with impaired kidney function were deter-
mined to be legally indistinguishable from the claims at issue in Vanda.105  Additionally, in Natu-
ral Alternatives International, Inc. v. Creative Compounds, LLC, claims relating to the use of beta-
 
99 Id. at 9. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 See David O. Taylor, Confusing Patent Eligibility, 84 TENN. L. REV. 157 (2016). 
103 Jeffrey A. Lefstin, et al., Addressing Patent Eligibility Challenges, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 551,552 (2018). 
104 Id.  
105 Donald Zuhn, Patent Legislation, PATENT DOCS (Jan. 2, 2020) https://www.patentdocs.org/patent_legislation/. 
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alanine in dietary supplements to increase the anaerobic working capacity of muscle and other 
tissue, were patent eligible.106    
However, another possible hurdle is that the addition of a method of treatment step to make 
a claim patent eligible may be viewed as mere “draftsman’s art.”107  This was a concern raised in 
Mayo that patent statutes should not be interpreted in ways that make patent eligibility “depend 
simply on draftsman’s art” without reference to the “principles underlying the prohibition against 
patents for [natural laws].”108  There seems to be no clear way to draw the line for such matters.  
B. Role in Future Personalized Medicine Treatment Patents 
In addition to the potential problems articulated above, there is also uncertainty in the fate 
of future personalized medicine treatment patents.  Molecular diagnostics play a central role in 
driving precision medicine research and development.109  It provides the clues for determining 
disease predisposition, diagnosing disease, assessing disease prognosis, predicting drug response, 
and targeting prescriptions and diagnostics.110  Thus, precision medicine depends critically upon 
balanced regulation and intellectual property rights.111  However, the Mayo/Alice Two-Step has 
resulted in significant uncertainty in biotechnology.112  Commentators have criticized the test as 
being “indeterminate” and “overly restrictive” as the test has been applied to invalidate a wide 
range of patents.113  It certainly seems that the vagueness surrounding biotechnology patent pro-
tection has contributed to the weakening of the U.S patent system as well.114 
VI. Draft Reform Bill 
 
106 Id.  
107 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012). 
108 Id. 
109 Lefstin & Menell, supra note 103, at 551.  
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
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A. Background 
On May 22, 2019, a bipartisan group of lawmakers released a draft bill that would reform 
Section 101.115  In addition to Section 101, the bill included proposals to amend Section 100 (k) 
and 112 (f) of the Patent Act as well.116  During the four hearings held regarding the state of patent 
eligibility in the United States, a total of forty-five witnesses testified, which once again highlights 
the great importance of the draft bill and the many debates surrounding this area of patent law.117  
The witnesses included stakeholders, industry leaders, and small business owners across a wide 
range of the technology spectrum.118  
B. Changes to Section 101  
The draft bill includes three legislative provisions that require further deliberations as 
they appear to have the most significant impact, if enacted in their current form.119  
1. First legislative provision 
The “provisions of section 101 shall be construed in favor of patentability.”120  This lan-
guage signals a potential return to what many referred to as the original interpretation of Section 
101—a gate keeper threshold of what types of inventions are patent eligible and what types are 
not.121  Accordingly, this first legislative provision appears to reflect the committee’s intent to 
refocus Section 101 as an eligibility threshold and not a standard for determining patentability.122  
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2. Second legislative provision 
The second provision states that all cases establishing or interpreting the judicially created 
exceptions to subject matter eligibility are “hereby abrogated.”123  In addition, this provision states 
that “no implicit or other judicially created exceptions to subject matter including ‘abstract ideas, 
laws of nature, or natural phenomena’ shall be used to determine patent eligibility.”124  This is by 
far the most drastic reform proposed in this bill.  Essentially, adoption of this provision would 
eliminate a decade’s worth of Supreme Court precedent.125  
3. Third legislative provision 
The third provision states that eligibility of a claimed invention under Section 101 shall be 
determined “without regard to: the manner in which the claimed invention was made; whether 
individual limitations of a claim are well known, conventional or routine; the state of the art at the 
time of the invention; or any other considerations relating to sections 102, 103, or 112 of this 
article.”126  This is further evidence, along with the first legislative provision, that Section 101 is 
intended to be a mere eligibility threshold and not a final determinate on patentability.127  By ex-
plicitly removing the controversial “well known, conventional, or routine” standard for Section 
101 analysis, the Subcommittee leaves such determination for analysis under Sections 102, 103, 
and 112 instead.128  This should reduce the conflation between eligibility and patentability stand-
ards currently applied by the USPTO and the Federal Courts.129 
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Judge Michel delivered the most resounding endorsement of the bill stating that, after 
spending twenty-two years on the Federal Circuit and nine years deciding on patent cases, he “can-
not predict in a given case whether eligibility will be found or not found.”130  He followed by 
stating “if I can’t do it, how can bankers, venture capitalists, business executives, and all the other 
players in the system make reliable predictions and sensible decisions?”131   This perspective 
clearly articulates the need for clarifications of the current patent eligible subject matter require-
ments, which warrants review.  
D. Shortfalls of the Draft Bill 
Although a reform of the Patent Act is crucial, the proposed draft bill in its current form 
will be unhelpful in promoting future innovation for several reasons.  First, a broad eligibility 
requirement will “increase the issuance of bad patents, and therefore, will increase frivolous liti-
gation.”132  Second, the current draft law would abolish the holding in Alice to the detriment of 
individuals and small businesses.133  Small entities have benefited from Alice because “courts have 
been able to invalidate patent claims and dismiss cases before the expensive discovery and expert 
witness phases.”134  Third, the draft bill would allow for patenting of genes due to the abrogation 
of Myriad.135  Sean George, CEO of Invitae, noted that the “golden age of precision medicine 
ushered in by the unanimous [Myriad], [Alice], and [Mayo] decisions has just begun.  Patient care 
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in spite of it.”136  The dangers of opening the door for patenting of personalized medication treat-
ment may do more harm than good by hindering the continuous developments of such treatments 
and negatively impacting the nation’s status as a top contributor to the patent regime.  
1. Exclusive Categories of Statutory Subject Matter 
It is unclear whether the bill will be revised to include the closed list of exclusive categories 
of statutory subject matter that would not be eligible for patent protection, as previously proposed 
in the Subcommittee’s draft outline back in April of 2019.137  The proposed exclusive categories 
are fundamental scientific principles, products that exist solely and exclusively in nature, pure 
mathematical formulas, economic or commercial principles, and mental activities.138  If it is in-
cluded, the language is once again vague and subjective, likely to result in various interpretations 
and adding to the confusion it purports to clarify.139  The claims that are currently rejected as being 
directed to natural phenomena or laws of nature will likely continue to be rejected as being directed 
to a fundamental scientific principle under this new provision.140  Thus, the need for further judicial 
interpretation leads us back to the current dilemmas of Section 101.141   
Moreover, having a set exclusionary list would require regular updating and may not ade-
quately protect new and emerging technology.142  Congress must recognize the confusion that this 
language presents, and ensure that any statutory exclusion more clearly defines the bounds of the 
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2. Constitutional Concerns 
The draft reform bill’s expansion of patent eligibility also triggers constitutional concerns 
as well.144  For example, it would “permit government-sanctioned monopolies to private parties 
over fields of knowledge, limiting information sharing and free experimentation, raising serious 
concerns about whether the patent system would be blocking, rather than promoting, progress.”145  
The concern is that government-granted exclusive monopolies over bodies of knowledge, such as 
patents on human genes, human thought processes, or abstract ideas, would violate our constitu-
tional rights to speak and express ourselves, and receive information free from government re-
straint.146  Accordingly, an overly broad application would hinder the growth of our patent system.  
3. Policy Concerns 
Finally, there are other policy concerns at issue as well.  For example, there could be neg-
ative impacts on the cost, quality, and availability of American healthcare with the enactment of 
this current draft reform bill.147  This viewpoint was articulated by Charles Duan, director of tech-
nology and innovation policy at the R Street Institute.148  He warned that the draft legislation would 
lead to “the practice of ‘evergreening,’ in which a drug company obtains a patent on a minor mod-
ification to a known drug compound, often years after the initial patent application on the drug was 
filed.”149  The potential adverse impact on healthcare by a broad eligibility standard can be articu-
lated through Myriad as well.150  Once Myriad could not enforce its patents, competitors offering 
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diagnostic screening for breast and ovarian cancer could, and did, enter the market immediately, 
charging just a fraction of what Myriad’s test cost.151  Thus, patents on natural laws and products 
would reduce development of lifesaving tests and treatments.152  In particular, patents on genes 
and diagnostics would prevent patients from obtaining second opinions as well.153  
E. Adoption of the Draft Reform Bill 
There is no doubt that Section 101 warrants clarification in order to create a more predict-
able judicial application of subject matter eligibility.  Thus, patent eligibility should be judged by 
what is defined by the claims as a whole, instead of engaging in claim dissection.  This is part of 
the proposed bill: “Eligibility under this section shall be determined only while considering the 
claimed invention as a whole, without discounting or disregarding any claim limitation.”154 
This proposal is also supported in the cases of Diamond v. Chakrabarty and Diamond v. 
Diehr.  In Chakrabarty, the patent claims were for human-made, genetically engineered bacterium 
that was capable of breaking down multiple components of crude oil.155  Claims “plainly qualif[y] 
as patentable subject matter” because they were directed to a non-naturally occurring manufacture 
or composition of matter.156  Here, the Court focused on the significant amount of human inter-
vention in the claims, as well as the markedly different characteristics of the bacteria from any 
found in nature and the significant utility of the claimed bacteria.157  Ultimately, the Supreme Court 
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held that a claim to a genetically engineered bacterium was patent eligible because the claimed 
bacterium did not fall within the “product of nature” exception.158 
In Diehr, the claims were directed to a process for curing synthetic rubber.159  While the 
claims employed a mathematical equation, they were not directed solely to the equation.160  In 
determining the eligibility of the claimed process for patent protection under Section 101, 
the Court held that their claims must be considered as a whole.161  The reasoning behind this was 
that it was inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and new elements and then to ignore the 
presence of the old elements in the analysis.162  This is especially true in a process claim because 
a new combination of steps in a process may be patentable even though all the parts of the combi-
nation were well known and in common use before the combination was made.163 
Furthermore, the new bill should contain language expressly eliminating judicial excep-
tions and requiring the Court to adhere to strict statutory construction instead. The proposed bill 
does include a provision stating, “No implicit or other judicially created exceptions to subject 
matter eligibility, including ‘abstract ideas,’ ‘laws of nature,’ or ‘natural phenomena,’ shall be 
used to determine patent eligibility under section 101, and all cases establishing or interpreting 
those exceptions to eligibility are hereby abrogated.”164  However, as noted in Section D above, 
there is a list of exclusive categories of statutory subject matter including fundamental scientific 
principles, products that exist solely and exclusively in nature, pure mathematical formulas, eco-
nomic or commercial principles, and mental activities.165  This subjective language leads to the 
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danger of varying interpretations and continued confusion for patent applicants and exmainers 
alike. Therefore, adding the requirement for the Courts to carry out strict statutory construction 
would help to moderate some of the potential issues that may arise with the list of exclusive cate-
gories requiring judicial interpretation.  
VII. Conclusion  
The current patent eligible subject matter requirement under Section 101 of the Patent 
Act has led to different interpretations by the Courts and confusion for patent applicants and ex-
aminers alike.  It is promising that Congress has taken steps to attempt to correct the uncertainty 
created by the Supreme Court in deciding what falls within the categories of “laws of natural, 
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.”  However, the current draft reform bill should not be en-
acted in its current form as it broadens the eligibility of patents that could potentially lead to ad-
verse effects and thwart, rather than promote, innovation.  The broadening of the eligibility thresh-
old potentially increases assertions and litigation, leaving innovators to be preoccupied with liti-
gation, rather than innovation. 
In addition, the proposed outline merely changes the exceptions from judicially created to 
legislatively created exceptions.  The danger lies in the Court’s subsequent determinations of what 
exactly constitutes a “fundamental scientific principle, product that exist solely and exclusively in 
nature, pure mathematical formulas, economic or commercial principles, or mental activities.”  
Thus, a defined, closed set of categories of excluded subject matter would in essence be codifying 
the judicially created exceptions of the current statute.  For example, “fundamental scientific prin-
ciples” can be construed by the Court to indicate an approval of their “abstract ideas” or “law of 
nature” test and to decide cases in the same manner as before.  Likewise, the “products that exist 
solely and exclusively in nature” category could be construed by the Court to affirm the Myriad 
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decision.  Therefore, the proposed excluded categories are too vague, inviting the Court to create 
more difficult law.  
Responsibilty lies with Congress to bring greater clarity, consistency, and logic to the pa-
tent eligible subject matter requirements under Section 101 of the Patent Act.  Thoughtful legisla-
tion can further improve the patent system and provide increased protection for therapeutic meth-
ods, which are crucial for new innovations and continuous development, especially in the area of 
life sciences.  The monopoly granted to a patent owner is a property right and its boundaries should 
be clear.  Therefore, it would be helpful to include language in the new bill expressly prohibiting 
judicial exceptions and requiring the Court to carry out strict statutory construction instead.  This 
clarity is essential to promote progress, because it enables efficient investment in innovation and 
the ability to maintain the nation’s esteemed status in the world of patents.  
 
 
 
 
